The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspondence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Behavioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior) of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach, however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.
The idea that scientists are primarily concerned with understanding the natural world is taken by most to be axiomatic. Not all scholars are entirely convinced that this is the case, however. The philosophical tradition known as pragmatism, for example, questions the apparently obvious idea that science is concerned with developing an increasingly accurate picture of the universe as it really is (see Goodman, 1995) . Pragmatists, it is commonly believed, are not concerned with the nature of reality, but with successful working. For a pragmatist, a statement or theory gains truth value if This paper is dedicated to Yvonne. I missed you all those years, my love.
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Requests for reprints may be addressed to Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland (Email: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes @may.ie). it helps an individual achieve some practical goal; whether or not the statement or theory reflects an ontological reality is seen to be irrelevant from the pragmatist's perspective (Barnes & Roche, 1997) . In contrast to this view of pragmatism, L. J. Hayes' (1993) has argued that upon close scrutiny pragmatists are in fact very concerned with the nature of reality. The current article begins with a detailed summary of her argument. Subsequently, Quine's concept of the observation sentence is examined. This "mainstream" pragmatist concept is then used to evaluate the accuracy of Hayes's claim that pragmatists are concerned with the nature of reality, and as a result the accuracy of the claim is found to be somewhat ambiguous. Quine's concept of the observation sentence, however, also appears to raise a problem. In the second half I In the current article I will be citing both L. J. Hayes and S. C. Hayes, but the former will be cited far more frequently than the latter, and thus inserting the initials L. J. for every appropriate citation would be rather unwieldy. Consequently, I will simply cite Hayes in the former case, but always refer to the latter author as S. C. Hayes.
DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES of the article, therefore, a behavior-analytic version of pragmatism is offered that aims to address both the claim made by Hayes (vis-a-vis pragmatism's concern with reality) and the problem raised by Quine's concept of the observation sentence.
HAYES ON REALITY AND TRUTH One-and Two-Universe Systems
According to Hayes (1993) , all human enterprises may be divided into just two categories: one-universe and two-universe systems. Hayes argues that one-universe systems resist description, and that they underlie the mystic traditions. In other words, oneuniverse systems may be hinted at or implied (e.g., through Buddhist koans), but they cannot be spoken about directly. One cannot speak about another universe, in a one-universe system, because in doing so one creates a twouniverse system (i.e., the universe of speaking and the universe about which one speaks).
Beyond the oneness, about which one cannot speak, there are ways of talking about the universe; what Hayes calls conventional two-universe philosophies. Under the rubric of conventional philosophy, Hayes lists the idealisms, including subjective idealism and solipsism, in which the existence of the knower is not questioned, and thus the knower constitutes reality in these positions. Hayes also lists more elaborated or extended forms of idealism, in which the existence of the knower is denied. Instead the knower is considered to be an aspect of some sort of deity. If the deity can be spoken about this constitutes a two-universe system, but if the deity cannot be described, such a position may be categorized as a one-universe system.
Hayes also lists the realisms as examples of conventional philosophy, which she subdivides into naive and not-so-naive realism. For the former, the universe exists independently of the knower and can be known, more or less, as it actually is. This is the commonsense view of the world, and Hayes points out that few technical philosophers subscribe to this view. The latter, not-so-naive realism, constitutes the position to which most technical philosophers of this genre subscribe. According to this position, the universe exists independently of the knower, but it cannot be known as such. According to Hayes, the knower's involvement serves to differentiate the many positions falling into this category. In some cases the knower gains knowledge from sources other than experience or learning (e.g., innate or extranatural sources; Kant). Objective idealism is similar in certain respects (Plato and Hegel). What unifies these positions, according to Hayes, "is the contradictory proposition that we cannot know the world as it actually is because our knowledge of the world as it actually is does not correspond to what we know about it" (1993, p. 37) .
Hayes also points out that other realists accept that knowledge of the world is gained via contact with the world, and because such contact differs across knowers, and because no one has contacted the universe in its entirety, the known world has the stamp of each knower's particular experience and thus differs from the world as it actually exists. From this point of view, knowing is the issue, not existence, and epistemology is the focus, not ontology.
According to Hayes, if this type of not-so-naive realist assumed that knowing was not about anything-that speaking was not referential-this position might be considered an example of a one-universe system, and as such ontological concerns would be irrelevant. Hayes argues, however, that for most realists "knowing is something knowers do with respect to things other than themselves" (1993, p. 37). Consequently, despite the reluctance of the not-so-naive realist to deal with ontological issues, the ontological reality of the universe is implicated whenever epistemological issues with respect to
